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Montero v. Meyer: Official English, Initiative Petitions and
the Voting Rights Act
I.

INTRODUCTION

Now the whole earth was of one language .... And the Lord came down
to see the city and the tower, which the sons of men had built. And the
Lord said, "Behold, they are one people, and they have all one language;
this is only the beginning of what they will do; what they propose to do
will not be impossiblefor them. Come let us go down, and there confuse
their language, that they may not understandone another'sspeech. " So
the Lord scattered them abroadfrom the face of the earth ....
Therefore
its name was called Babel, because there the Lord confused the language
of all the earth ....

I

The Tower of Babel is a story of a united people whose nation disintegrated because their language became so mixed they could not understand one another.
The unique success of the United States of America as a melting pot
of cultures is the result of a conscientious effort to maintain a common
language. For example, to obtain citizenship in the United States under
naturalization laws, a candidate must demonstrate "an understanding of
the English language, including an ability to read, write, and speak
'2
words in ordinary usage in the English language."
Efforts in Colorado to preserve English as the state's official language resulted in the passage of an official English amendment to the
Colorado Constitution in November 1988.
The Colorado amendment ratifies in law what is a social and cultural fact: English is already the common language of Colorado. The
amendment reads as follows: "The English language is the official language of the State of Colorado. This section is self executing; however,
3
the General Assembly may enact laws to implement this section."1
The Colorado amendment is strikingly similar to a proposed
amendment to the United States Constitution which was introduced in
4
the United States Senate by Senator Sam Hayakawa of California.
Although the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the issue in
1984, 5 Congress has not yet acted on the proposed federal amendment.
1. Genesis 11:1-9 (Revised Standard Version).

2. 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1982).
3. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1 (to be published in 1989).
4. The text of the proposed federal amendment reads:
Section 1. The English language shall be the official language of the United
States.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
5. The English Language Amendment, Hearings on S.j Res. 167 Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Senate Committee onjudiciary, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984).
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The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress analyzed the federal proposal and concluded that the first section declaring English as the official language, standing alone and without
reference to the subsequent enforcement provision, would not have any
practical legal effect. The practical force and effect of the amendment
would therefore turn largely on the exercise by Congress of the power
granted to it in section one to enforce the article by appropriate legislation. Implementing congressional action, in order to be valid, must be
"plainly adapted to that end" of enforcing the amendment and "not
prohibited by but ... consistent with 'the letter and spirit of the Constitution.' "6 These observations of the Congressional Research Service,
by analogy, apply as well to the Colorado constitutional amendment.
The Colorado amendment was not passed without opposition. In
Colorado a proposed amendment to the state constitution may be
placed on the ballot through an initiative procedure reserving to the citizens of the state the power to enact laws and to amend the state constitution independent of the legislative assembly. 7 Opponents challenged
the methods used in the petitioning phase of the initiative procedure.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado, in an
ironic twist, ruled that certain of the initiative petitions were invalid because they were circulated in English only. The court granted a preliminary injunction against the initiative so that it could not be placed on the
ballot in the November 1988 general election.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, seven days prior to the election, reversed the district court and ordered that the initiative be placed
on the ballot. The amendment passed. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 8
II.

BACKGROUND

Colorado State Representative Barbara Murray Phillips introduced
legislation in the 1987/1988 session of the Colorado General Assembly
to declare English the official language of the state of Colorado. When
the 1987/1988 general session came to a close and Representative Phillips had not attained her goal, she contacted the Official English Committee 9 in Colorado to generate a proposed amendment to the
Colorado Constitution through the initiative process.
Representative Phillips and other proponents of the initiative sub6.

Dale, Legal Analysis of S.J. Res. 167 Proposing an Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to

Make English the Official Language of the United States, Congressional Research Service, The
Library of Congress (June 13, 1984), citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51
(1966).
7. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-101 to 115 (1973 & Supp. 1988). See also COLO.
CONST. art. V, § 1.
8. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3249
(1989).
9. The Official English Committee is a national organization founded by Senator
Sam Hayakawa to preserve and promote the English language.
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mitted a draft proposal, pursuant to statutory initiative procedures, 10 to
the Colorado Legislative Counsel Staff and the Legislative Drafting Office. These two agencies reviewed the proposal and met with Representative Phillips to discuss the agencies' comments.
On April 29, 1987 the Official English Committee formally submitted the proposed amendment to the state constitution to the Colorado
Secretary of State, Natalie Meyer ("the Secretary"). The Secretary's office issued a notice the next day indicating that a public hearing would
be held on May 6, 1987. The notice of the hearing was written and published only in the English language. The notice stated that at the hearing a title for the amendment, a ballot title, and a submissions clause
would be set. A summary of the proposed initiative would also be prepared, all as required by the Colorado statute."I Notice of the hearing
was given to the public by mailing copies of the notice to all parties who
had registered an interest with the Secretary and by posting copies in
12
the press room of the capital building.
The Secretary announced at the May 6, 1987 hearing that any protest to the language of the initiative would have to be filed within thirty
days. She also sent a letter dated May 7, 1987 to Representative Phillips
which stated that any protest concerning the title or the submissions
clause must be filed within forty-eight hours of the hearing. 13 There
were no other public notices concerning the right to protest the form or
the content of the proposal. The Secretary did not receive any protest
to the proposed initiative.
The members of the Official English Committee and Representative
Phillips printed the initiative in the form of petitions in accordance with
the statutory guidelines. 14 These petitions were written only in the English language and were circulated in numerous counties in Colorado.
The petitions were filed on October 29, 1987 with the Secretary, who
verified on November 13, 1987 that an adequate number of valid signatures appeared on the petition forms. The Secretary then issued a public notice that protests to the petitions could be filed on or before
November 27, 1987.15
Rita Montero filed a verified protest with the Secretary on November 27, 1987. In her protest she asserted that the petitions circulated by
the Official English Committee did not comply with the Federal Voting
Rights Act, 16 and therefore the signatures gathered in the bilingual
10. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-101(l)-(3) (Supp. 1988).
11. The purpose of the Title Board, pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-101(2)
(Supp. 1988), is to set a proper fair title for the proposed constitutional amendments and a

submissions clause. See also In re Proposed Initiative Concerning Drinking Age, 691 P.2d
1127 (Colo. 1984) (board created to assist the people in implementation of right to initiate
laws).
12. Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, Montero v. Meyer, 696 F.
Supp. 540 (D. Colo. 1988) (No. 88-C-889).
13. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 1-40-102 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
14. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-104 to 107 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
15. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 1-40-109 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
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counties were invalid.1 7 She also asserted that the language of the proposed amendment was unconstitutionally vague and that a fiscal impact
statement previously filed with'the Secretary in connection with the initiative was vague and unconstitutional. She also claimed that her due
process rights were violated due to a lack of adequate notice of the May
6 hearing.
A hearing on Rita Montero's protest was held by the Secretary on
December 15, 1987. The Secretary refused to hear any evidence or arguments regarding the alleged violations of the Voting Rights Act' 8 and
deprivation of due process rights 19 resulting from the lack of notice provided to Ms. Montero and other persons similarly situated. The Secretary ruled that jurisdiction of those issues is in the federal courts and the
only issue that properly could be raised at this protest hearing was the
validity of the signatures appearing on the petitions. Because there were
no allegations that the signatures were not of registered voters or that
specific signatures were improper the Secretary dismissed the protest.
III.

COLORADO DISTRICT COURT DECISION

Ms. Montero then filed an action 20 in the District Court for the
State of Colorado to compel the Secretary to hear the alleged Voting
Rights Act violation and the constitutional issues.
The district court dismissed the action on May 23, 1987, agreeing
that the Colorado Secretary of State did not have any authority to rule
on Federal Voting Rights Act violations. Further, the court stated that
matters of constitutional vagueness could not be determined prior to
21
the election approving the proposed initiative.
The court held the Secretary did not act arbitrarily or capriciously
and did not abuse her discretion by dismissing the protest, nor were due
process rights denied by her actions. The court ordered that the proposed initiative be placed on the November 8, 1988 general election
Whenever any State or political subdivision subject to the prohibitions of the
second sentence of subsection 4(a) of this section provides any registration or
voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information
relating to the electoral process, including ballots, it shall provide them in the
language of the applicable language minority group, as well as in the English
language....
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(c) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any State or political subdivision subject to the prohibitions of
subsection (b) of this section provides any registration or voting notices, forms,
instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the electoral
process, including ballots, it shall provide them in the language of the applicable
minority group, as well as in the English language....
17. The counties subject to bilingual requirements of the amended Voting Rights Act
of 1965, in which the petitions were circulated, are: Alamosa, Archuleta, Bent, Conejos,
Costillo, El Paso, HuerFano, Las Animas, Otero, Pueblo, Rio Grande, and Saguache. 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f)(4) & 1973aa-la(c) (1982).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. 1986).
19. Reporter's Partial Transcript at 5, Montero v. Meyer, 696 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo.
1988) (No. 88-C-889).
20. Pursuant to COLO. R. Civ. PROC. 106(a)(4) (1973 & Supp. 1988).
21. Reporter's Partial Transcript at 8-9, Montero v. Meyer, 696 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo.
1988) (No. 88-C-889).
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ballot by the Secretary. 2 2
It is interesting to note that the court was satisfied that the Federal
Voting Rights Act (the "Act") does not apply to the circulating of petitions. While the Act may apply to some petitions, the court held it does
not apply to petitions used by the public to place an initiative measure
on the ballot. Only after the initiative is on the ballot would the Act
apply. The court stated "[t]he ballot and the accompanying submissions
clause . . .have to be bilingual at that time, at the November general
election, but not at the time the petitions are circulated."' 23 Thereafter,
Rita Montero filed an action in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado.
IV.

FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT DECISION

The complaint in the federal district court alleged initiative petitions are "materials or information relating to the electoral process"
which under the Act 24 cannot be circulated in only the English language
in bilingual counties. The Act defines bilingual counties as those counties in which more than five percent of the citizens of voting age are
members of a single language minority group. 25 The plaintiffs claimed
that the rights of Colorado citizens to vote and to participate in the electoral process had been unlawfully abridged because the initiative petitions circulated in bilingual counties of Colorado were not printed in
both English and Spanish. The complaint alleged that over sixty-one
thousand of the petition signatures from bilingual counties were invalid
because the petitions were not printed in both languages.
The complaint also asserted that the plaintiff's due process rights
under the fourteenth amendment were violated by the Secretary's alleged failure to provide adequate notice of the May 6, 1987 hearing.
Plaintiffs prayed for a declaratory judgment and for injunctive relief.
The Secretary, joined by the Official English Committee, filed a motion to dismiss, contending the Act does not apply to the ballot initiative
petitions and the plaintiffs were not entitled to notice of the May 6 hearing because it was quasi-legislative in nature, requiring only general notice to the public.
The federal district court granted a preliminary injunction on September 16, 1988 barring placement of the official language amendment
on the general election ballot. The court held initiative petitions must
be circulated in both the English and Spanish languages under the Act if
the petitions are a part of the electoral process. The electoral process
was held to include all activities which are required to occur prior to the
holding of an election under state law and which therefore are prerequisites to voting. 2 6 The court held Colorado law requires that petitions be
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 4.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(0(4) & 1974aa-la(c) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(b) (1982).
Montero v. Meyer, 696 F. Supp. 540, 547 (D. Colo. 1988).
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circulated prior to an election for a constitutional amendment by initiative and "[tihus it is an essential step in the electoral process." 27 The
court also held "as a matter of law, ballot petitions constitute 'materials
or information relating to the electoral process', within the meaning of
28
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f)(4) and 1973aa-la(c)."
Voting Rights Act requirements apply only to state action. The
court held governmental action dictated by the state initiative statutes,
which includes a review and comment, a setting of title, the counting of
signatures, and the holding of hearings to entertain challenges to petitions, constitutes state action under the Act. 29 Since it was likely that
plaintiffs would prevail on the merits, the court granted the temporary
injunction without addressing due process issues.
V.

TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

The Secretary and the Official English Committee in a hurried move
before election day, appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit. Its decision, handed down November 1, 1988, reversed the judgment of the United States District Court, vacated the preliminary injunction, and remanded the case.
The Tenth Circuit held that the language of the Voting Rights Act
concerning the electoral process had been construed too broadly by the
federal district court when it ruled that initiative petitions are a part of
the electoral process. The court held that the electoral process is limited to actions directly related to voting. The court reasoned that the
Act limits the meaning of the term "vote" to include only action that
involves "registering one's choice at a special, primary, or general election." 3 0° Therefore, only matters which are prerequisite to voting and
relate directly to the casting of a ballot are a part of the electoral process. "This interpretation accords with the common meaning of the
31
word 'vote'."
Implicit in the common and statutory definitions of voting is the
presence of a choice to be made. The court wrote: "One ordinarily
votes to pick one candidate or another, or one votes for or against the
adoption of an initiated measure. Thus, applying the concept of voting
to a process which provides no choice defies the commonly accepted
usage of the term. "32
The Tenth Circuit found no way to register opposition to an initiative under the Colorado procedure until the measure reaches the ballot,
likening the circulation of a petition to the process of nomination. The
court held the electoral process to which the bilingual requirements of
27. Id. at 547.
28. Id. at 548.
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f)(4) & 1973aa-la(c) (1982 & Supp. 1984) states "whenever
any State or political subdivision provides ......
30. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 607 (10th Cir. 1988).

31. Id. at 607.
32. Id.
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the Act apply "does not commence under Colorado.law until the Secretary of State certifies the measure is qualified for placement on the ballot, and that signing of an initiated petition is not 'voting'." 3 3 The court
concluded:
The Congressional purpose in expanding the Act to include the
minority language provisions was to give 'meaningful assistance to allow the voter to cast an effective ballot.'3 4 The view
adopted by the [United States] District Court takes the Act into
activity outside of the casting of a ballot and improperly broad35
ens the scope of the law.
The Tenth Circuit also disagreed with the trial court on the state
action issue. Although the district court concluded that the initiative petitions had been provided to the public by the state, the Tenth Circuit
held that the state, through its officials, merely performed ministerial
acts designed to make the initiative process impartial and fair but did
not provide petitions to the public. The Tenth Circuit cited the Colorado Constitution, 3 6 which states that a person who circulates an initiative petition exercises an individual right solely for himself and not for
the state. The court held "[a]t most, the acts of the state officers could
be regarded as 'regulatory', but state regulation is insufficient to convert
'37
private action into state action."
In announcing its decision, the Tenth Circuit cited with approval a
similar case from California, Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles.38 In Zaldivar, a
notice of intention to recall a councilman, which had been circulated in
English only, was challenged under the Act. The federal district court
held that there was no state action involved in the recall attempt.
Rather, efforts to place the recall before the electorate were made solely
by private citizens. The recall petition process is not part of the electoral process because "nothing one would associate with an election occurs at that stage; principally, no voting occurs .... The court cannot
reasonably conclude that such conduct violates the Act when it is merely
the first step in a process which might ultimately lead to the holding of
39
an election."
The court in California also found the action to be frivolous, and
imposed sanctions upon the plaintiff's attorneys pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The attorneys appealed and the Ninth Circuit 40 held: 1) a plausible, good faith argument could be made by a
competent attorney to the effect that state action existed; and 2) a good
faith argument could be made that a recall petition is part of the electo33. Id.
34. Id. at 608 (citing S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 774, 799).

35.
36.
37.
38.

Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 608 (10th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 609 (citing COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1).
Id. at 610.
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 590 F. Supp. 852 (C.D. Cal. 1984).

39. Id. at 855.

40. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
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ral process. It was, therefore improper for the district court to impose
sanctions under Rule 11.
The only issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit was the applicability
of Rule 11. While discussing the Rule 11 issue, however, the court indicated the Act did apply to the petitions. But, in the words of the Tenth
Circuit, that "observation was the purest of dictum .... The focus was
to test whether counsel had asserted an arguable claim by contending
the Act applied to the petition process."' 4 1 Thus, the Tenth Circuit was
not swayed by the Ninth Circuit's footnote. Rather, it held that the initiative process is not state action, and reversed the federal district court's
decision.
VI.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT

Ms. Montero unsuccessfully petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. See supra note 8. Petitioners challenged
the Tenth Circuit's holding that the state's regulation of the form of
petitions to initiate a state constitutional amendment does not constitute
state action for purposes of the Voting Rights Act. They also challenged
the ruling that petitions are not "materials or information relating to the
electoral process" and that petitions are not a prerequisite to voting or a
standard procedure or practice with respect to voting within the meaning of the Act.
A further issue could have arisen in the Supreme Court. In a footnote 4 2 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged a first amendment issue which
had been raised by the defendants. Since the federal district court did
not consider the argument, the Tenth Circuit did not rule upon it. Defendants' contention was that the initiative process is core political
speech protected by the first amendment; therefore it cannot be fettered
by the imposition of the Act.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the first amendment issue
when it upheld a Tenth Circuit decision, Meyer v. Grant,43 striking down
a Colorado statutory provision which made it a crime to use paid petition circulators in the initiative process. The Supreme Court held that
since the state afforded its citizens the right to an initiative procedure to
bring about political and social change, it cannot interfere with the exercise of that right. The Court held:
Appellees seek by petition to achieve political change in Colorado; their right freely to engage in discussions concerning the
41. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 608 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
42. Montero v. Meyer, 861 F.2d 603, 607-08 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988) reads as follows:
Defendants raise another issue which we do not consider, whether the Act
can be applied to the right of initiative. Plaintiffs contend the initiative process is
"core political speech," Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1892-93 (1988), which
cannot be fettered by the imposition of the Act. Because the district court did not
consider this argument, and it is not essential to our analysis, we will not address
it.
43. Meyer v. Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988).
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need for that change is guarded by the First Amendment. The
circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both
the expression of a desire for political 44
change and a discussion
of the merits of the proposed change.
This decision clearly indicates that the initiative petition process is
protected core political speech for purposes of the first and fourteenth
amendments. But for now the Supreme Court has decided not to further examine the issue.
VII.
A.

ANALYSIS

Colorado Constitution and Statutory Regulations

The Tenth Circuit was correct when it held there is no state action
involved in the circulating of initiative petitions. The Colorado Consti45
tution provides that the right to initiative is reserved to the people.
The absence of state action in the initiative process is obvious in Article
V, Section 1(5) of the Colorado Constitution. In reference to the process of submitting the proposed initiative to the legislative research and
drafting office for comment and review, the Colorado Constitution
states that the drafting office shall render its comments to the proponents of the initiative but "[n]either the general assembly nor its committees or agencies shall have any power to require the amendment,
modification, or other alteration of the text of any such proposed measure." 4 6 The state constitution does not allow any government entity to
change the content of an individual's proposed amendment to the
constitution.
The statutes which govern placing an initiative on the ballot are
47
designed to keep the procedure uniform and the information clear.
The individuals sponsoring the initiative bear all the expense for the
petition process. The Secretary and the Title Board do not initiate the
petitions, draft the language of the petitions, or participate in the circulation of the petitions or the gathering of signatures. Nor are they in the
position of deciding the merits of the proposed initiative. 4 8 Their duties
are to ensure that the statutory procedures for form are followed, that
the title placed before the public is fair, that the submissions clause is
clear, and that the signatures are gathered by the appropriate means.
Likewise, the Secretary does not provide any materials to the public.
The individuals who are seeking to have the initiative placed on the ballot must provide all materials.
44. Id. at 1891.
45. CoLo. CONST. art. V., § 1(2).
46. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5).
47. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-40-106 & 107 (1973 & Supp. 1988).
48. See also In re Branch Banking Initiative, 200 Colo. 85, 612 P.2d 96 (1980); In re
Second Initiated Const. Amend., 200 Colo. 141, 613 P.2d 867 (1980); Spelts v. Klausing,
649 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1982) (impartiality by the board required).
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Case Law

As previously mentioned, 49 the United States Supreme Court upheld the Tenth Circuit holding in Meyer v. Grant50 that the state cannot
impede or diminish the power of the people to exercise the initiative
right once the state has reserved that power to the people. Only after
the initiative has been certified to the ballot must all information, materials, notices and ballots disseminated by the state be bilingual in the affected counties. There simply is no state action for purposes of the
Voting Rights Act until the initiative is certified to the ballot.
Lower courts in jurisdictions other than Colorado have held that
initiative petitions are not a prerequisite to voting and do not constitute
materials or information relating to the electoral process for purposes of
the Voting Rights Act.
The most current case regarding petitions is an Eleventh Circuit
case from Florida, Delgado v. Smith. 5 1 Citizens of Florida circulated, in
accord with the statutory procedure, petitions to gather enough signatures to have a proposed amendment to the Florida Constitution placed
on the ballot. The issue on appeal in this case was whether the petition,
written in English only and circulated in designated bilingual political
subdivisions, violated the Voting Rights Act. The court examined the
legislative history of the Act and concluded that Congress was concerned exclusively with a citizen's ability to exercise effectively his right
to vote. "The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted to remedy the
systematic exclusion of blacks from the polls by the use of poll taxes,
literacy tests, and similar devices." '5 2 Section 4(a) states that the purpose of the Act was to ensure that the right of citizens of the United
States to vote is not denied or abridged on account of race or color and
that no citizen shall be denied the right to vote in any election; federal,
53
state or local; because of his failure to comply with any test or device.
The Eleventh Circuit held "[t]here is no question that the sole purpose
of this legislation was to ensure the integrity of the registration and voting process by eradicating barriers which had previously prevented
'54
blacks from voting."
The court went on to examine amendments to the Act. In 1975,
amendments to the Act required official registration or election materials to be published in the language of minority groups as well as in English, thus extending the Act's coverage to other minority groups,
including Hispanics. The Committee on the Judiciary emphasized that
minority language groups were obstructed from exercising their rights
to vote because they were unable to understand the ballot and other
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See supra notes 43-44 & accompanying text.
108 S. Ct. 1886, 1893 (1988).
861 F.2d 1489 (11 th Cir. 1988) reh g denied (December 19, 1988).
Id. at 1492.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(4)(a) (Supp. 1986).
Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489, 1492 (11 th Cir. 1988).
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materials provided at the polls. 55 Then in 1982, Congress again
amended the Act to provide assistance at the voting booths for the blind
and the disabled who may be unable to cast their votes without help.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[oince again, it seems clear that
the purpose of Congress was to further expand access to the ballot. Significantly, Congress has never shown any intent, either in the text of its
legislation or in the legislative history, to expand coverage of the Act to
materials distributed by private citizens." 5 6 The Eleventh Circuit was
unwilling to expand the Act to cover initiative petitions stating, "[w]hile
undertaking such an expansion in the law might be within the power of
Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment, it is an inappropriate step
57
for us to take."
The court then looked at the interpretive guidelines issued by the
Department of Justice regarding the minority provisions of the Voting
Rights Act. Although the Department of Justice interpretation to the
effect that petitions are electoral material is entitled to considerable deference, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that these interpretations are to
be suggestive only, and that determination of what is required for compliance is the responsibility of the affected jurisdiction. The guidelines
should not be used as a substitute for analysis and decision by the af58
fected jurisdiction.
After examining the legislative history of the Act, the stated intention of Congress, and relevant case law including Montero v. Meyer, 59 the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the Act "does not apply to initiative petitions and the involvement by the State officials in the initiative process" 60 is ministerial and does not constitute state action for purposes of
the Act.
In a 1981 decision from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Gerena-Valentin v. Koch, 6 1 the petitions for
placing a candidate on the ballot were circulated in English only. The
New York Board of Elections provided the notices regarding registration and location of polling places in Spanish as well as English. The
board also provided bilingual assistance for voters at the polling places
during the election. The court held that the essential services for voting
had been provided and that "[t]he failure to provide bilingual petitions
does not by itself deprive the Hispanic community [members] of their
' 62
right to vote."
C. Legislative Committee Inquiry
Sixteen states have decided to preserve English as their official lan55.

1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 774, 800-04.

56. Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489, 1493 (11th Cir. 1988).
57.

Id.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

28 C.F.R. §§ 55.2(c) & 55.14(c) (1988).
861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1988).
523 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Id. at 177.
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63
guage through their constitutions or through statutory recognition.
In 1984, when the official language amendment to the United States
Constitution was introduced, Senator Orrin G. Hatch of the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee of the Judiciary, inquired as to the
effect of amendments in states having such provisions. Nebraska responded that the State of Nebraska had the English language declared
its official language in 1875 and has had "no problems either in government, schools, commerce or industry using English as our official
language."64
Illinois responded that its constitutional provision and the statutory
enactments of that provision did not prevent accommodations to individuals who did not know English well, such as providing translators in
court proceedings. It was Illinois' opinion that "the constitutional provision and statute may have had some tendency to persuade Americans
from various nations to learn English, an assimilation that undoubtedly
has contributed greatly to the stability and strength of this country."' 6 5

VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Colorado Constitution declares, "[tihe first power hereby reserved by the people is the initiative."' 66 This power cannot be abridged
by the state once the right has been reserved to the people. The object
of the Voting Rights Act is to make the total registration and voting
process fair to all citizens regardless of race, color, minority language, or
physical disability. In Montero v. Meyer, 67 the Tenth Circuit held that the
statutory procedures are designed to make the initiative procedure fair
and clear to all people of the State of Colorado. The actions of the state
in this case are ministerial and do not constitute state action for purposes of the Voting Rights Act. The Tenth Circuit also held "[tihe Act
is not written so broadly as to encompass all forms of petition." '6 8 Initiative petitions are not part of the electoral process and do not need to be
circulated in different languages in bilingual counties because the petitions do not directly relate to the casting of a ballot. The Voting Rights
Act does not apply until the measure is placed on the ballot.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion indicates the existence of a valid issue
as to whether the circulation of initiative petitions is protected political
speech. The Voting Rights Act cannot be construed to interfere with
first amendment free speech rights. Finally, the Tenth Circuit's opinion
63.
(1986);
(1987);
(1987).
64.

Arkansas (1987); California (1986); Colorado (1988); Florida (1988); Georgia
Hawaii (1978); Illinois (1969); Indiana (1984); Kentucky (1984); Mississippi
Nebraska (1920); North Carolina (1987); North Dakota (1987) & South Carolina
Letter from Allen J. Beermann, Secretary of State, Lincoln, Nebraska to Senator

Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 29, 1984).
65. Letter from Illinois Legislative Counsel, David R. Miller, Senior Staff Attorney to
Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Committee on theJudiciary (Nov. 28, 1984).
66. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(2).

67. 861 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1988).
68.

Id. at 609.
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is in line with other case law pertaining to petitions which also held that
initiative petitions simply are not part of the electoral process such that
the Voting Rights Act would apply.
Joni E. Speirs

